The leaders of the FSB jump for having studied the invasion badly. Camporini (former Chief of Staff): “Any hypothesis for Putin collides with the almost certainty of failure”
I’m under house arrest in Russia the head of the foreign intelligence service of the FSB and his deputy: Sergej Beseda and Anatolij Bolyukh
they had to provide the president Putin
the information necessary to carefully evaluate the situation within Ukraine
Instead, they provided misinformation and stole the money to enlist agents, piece together intelligence and organize subversive operations. Vladimir Putin would be furious
because the wrong picture of the Ukrainian reality is at the basis of the current bogging down of the army: the Russians expected that in a few hours the invaded country would collapse and that the Ukrainian military would not react. Beseda and Bolyukh would have resorted to several hundred Chechen guerrillas to assassinate the president Volodymyr Zelensky
, but President Kadyrov’s loyalists would have been eliminated by Ukrainian counter-intelligence. Another failure that would have convinced Putin to get rid of the two heads of the fifth service of the FSB, the successor of the KGB. The story also seems to indicate the existence of internal clashes in the intelligence organs and between the various services of the FSB.
Ukraine-Russia: the latest news on the war
The mistakes of intelligence
“The Russians seemed certain that their army would be greeted with the shedding of rose petals by the Ukrainian population, that the Ukrainian government would flee and that the problem would be solved in 48 hours: so a planned campaign was not needed,” he explains. to the Courier service Vincenzo Camporini, 75, former Italian Defense Chief of Staff. “If so, it is a sign of great superficiality, but also that the Russian intelligence services have given President Putin information that does not correspond to the reality on the ground. In every organization, the leader likes to hear yes, but what happened during the famous meeting of the National Security Council in which Putin’s head of Russian intelligence services, Sergei Naryshkin, was ridiculed is indicative ”. The feeling, therefore, is that the services reported to the Tsar what they wanted to hear: on the basis of that information, decisions were then made which proved to be wrong.
The bombs in the west
This also serves to include the bombings that began Friday on the western cities, Ivano-Frankivsk and Lutsk. “I think they are dictated by the need to increase the level of air control,” explains Camporini. A military campaign always begins with countering: fighter-bombers, escort interceptors and reconnaissance aircraft are sent to destroy the opponent’s air capabilities, in the air or on the ground, rendering airports unusable. Once the enemy has been prevented from using his air system, resources are dedicated to supporting the ground troops ». This phase in Ukraine has been missed.
Generals and recruits
The death of a third Russian general was confirmed on Friday, Andrey Kolesnikov
. According to Camporini, “the generals on the front line are a sign of combativeness of the Russian cadres, which however highlights how there is perhaps a shortage at the lower level”. One of the reasons is the use of conscription troops: in Russia there is still conscription and the boys do 12 months of conscription, during which they are sent to operational theaters. “In 12 months, what do you teach an 18-year-old boy?” Asks Camporini. “Just take the shotgun and pull the trigger. You can’t teach him sophisticated tactics and techniques. Just think of the symbiotic relationship between tanks and infantry: the tank is powerful but it is vulnerable, three men hiding behind a tree are enough and it jumps into the air. There must be collaboration with the infantry, and for this we need automatisms, we need refined training ».
The next steps
There will be an increase in thrust, also supported by the dispatch of new troops. “There is talk of almost 16,000 volunteers arriving from Syria, and of the contingent deployed in Nagorno Karabakh,” says Camporini. In this sense we can also interpret the possible arrival of Belarusian troops, which the Ukrainians believe is imminent: the invasion would be Minsk’s response to the alleged air raid that started from Ukraine and which, according to Kiev, would have been planned by Russia. Another way of building the pretext for Lukashenko’s reinforcements to enter the camp. In any case, the arrival of these reinforcements indicates two things: 1) that the initial plans were badly calibrated; 2) that the forces available on the Russian side are not sufficient: a sign of weakness rather than strength.
How can Putin get out of it
Putin can lose in so many ways. We do not know what he wants, and for this reason we cannot imagine a winning strategy. “Any hypothesis, however, collides with the almost certainty of failure,” explains General Camporini. “If it defeats the Ukrainian army on the ground and returns to Russia, Ukraine will rebel. If it occupies Ukraine permanently, it would need about half a million men, especially considering that, by bordering on other countries, it is possible to filter supplies to the insurgents, as happened in Afghanistan. Even in the hypothesis that the battle is won, it is probable that the war will be lost ».